Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Alice L. Wood v. Wayne Webster Wood, Norine M.
Johnson and Orlyn Johnson : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Cline, Wilson and Cline; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wood v. Johnson, No. 7271 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1016

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ALICE L. \Y"OOD,
PLAINTIFF AND ) .. PPELLANT,

I

vs.

·wAYNE \\'Ji}BSTER WOOD,

7272

(

DEFEXDANT AND RESPONDENT.

NORINE ?\f. JOHNSON,

l

)

DEFENDAN'r AND RESPONDENT.

vs.

/

ORL YN .TOHNSOX,

7271

)

DEFENDANT AXT> RESPONDENT.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
ON APPE.AI_J FllO~[ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
!1.,IFTH JlTDICIAL DISTRICT, OF THE STATE OF
lT'l,Ali, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY
HON. vVILI_j H. IIOYT, JunGE

Tr'I: .J......J. . vo:"
[~<1

r<~

· _

.....

-

:~ ;;:-,.,.

n
l~ ._ v .. (.)
_...,

_____

i

-

INE, Wn,soN AND CrANE,

19.,0
. .:U

.. ___________ .,,.._...,...

A ffornPJJS .fnr Appellants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-~----

SuBJECT INDEX

Page
Statetnent of the Cases and Facts ................................................ 1
Statement of Errors Relied On ....................................................

'1

Argument:
. ......... ........ .. ............. .. ...... ..... ...... .. ... ........ ........ ...........
The question presented by both cases is, Where
parties to a divorce action, after entry of an interlocutory decree of divorce but before the decree by
its terms or under the language of the statute becomes
final, resume marital relationship and conjugal cohabitation with the express intention of being and
living together as husband and wife, are they or
either of them entitled to have the interlocutory decree vacated and set aside on proper petition filed
after the six months' period? And in the Johnson
case, is the wife entitled to that relief under those
similar circumstances where the parties prior to the
eXJpiration of the six months' period stipulated -ln
writing that the decree be set aside- and vacated?

7

STATUTES CITED

Sections 40-3-6 and 40-3·7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 ............ 13
Section 42-340, R. S., 1943 (Nebraska) ........................................ 15
Chapter 56, Section 13, Colorado Statutes ................................ 12
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED

Githens v. Githens, 239 Pacific 1023 (Colo) ............... ............. 10
Jordan v. Jordan, 96 Pacific (2d) 13 (Colo) ............................ 14
Nelson v. Nelson, 60 Pacific (2d) 982 (Cal) ................................

9

Olson v. Superior Court, 165 Pacific 706 (Cal) ..........................

8

Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 82 Utah 179,
22 Pacific (2d, 1046 ....................................................·....

9·

Shinn v. Shinn, 148 Nebraska 832 ................................................ 15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
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ALICE L.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
S1'_._\'rEJIE0J'T OF 'rHE CASES AND F A_C'rS
These t""o cases haYe been consolidated for the purllOHe of this brief. The facts are practically the same and
the point of lR\V involved is identical. · ·

Each case involves an app.eal from an order .denying
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a petition to set aside and vacate an interlocutory decree
of di votce. The orders ".,.ere entered by the District Court
of the Fifth ,Judiciall)istrict of the State of Utah, in and
for Iron County, Utah, lion. Will If. IIoyt, Judge.
Alice L. "\Vood and 'Vayne '\Vebster \Vood \vere martied in 1941, and there is one child as the issue of the
matriage. 1farital difficulties arose and on October,
1946, the 'vife filed a divorce complaint. (Complaint,
.A.bs. 1). On February 3rd, 1947, the trial court entered
its interlocutory decree of divorce. (Decree, .A.bs. 40).
Thereafter, ~.nd before the said decree might, by its terms
become final, a reconciliation \Vas effected. The parties
commenced living together a.s and 'vith the express intention of being man and 'vife, and commenced conjugal cohabitation 'vhich continued to the time of hearing on· the
petition of both parties to have the said interlocutory
decree of divorce set aside and vacated. ( Abs. 45). Parenthetically, it is stated that such conjugal cohabitation
has continued to the present time. No final decree of
divorce \vas ever made or entered by the Court. After
the six montlu~' period from the entry of the said interlocutory deeree the parties filed the petition mentioned
to have the interlocutory de~1·e~ set aside and vacated.

rrhe trial court found the above to be the facts, and
thereupon concluded and ordered as follows ( Abs. 47-48:)

'• That the decree of divorce in this cause has
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become final and is not now subject to being set
aside or vacated.

''That this court does not have jurisdiction to
set aside an interlocutory decree of divorce where
application SQ to do is not made until after it has
become fhu'l under the terms of the statute;
"That the verified petition of plaintiff and de·
fendant to set aside and vacate the said interlocutory decree and to dismiss the \\rithin entitled cause
should be denied.
''NO\V THEREFORE, it is HEREBY OR:OERED, ADJUDGED and DECR.EED that the
petition of plaintiff and defendant to set aside and
vacate the said interlocutory decree and to dismiss
the 'vithin entitled cause be, and the same is hereby
denied.''
The f~rtcts, and the decision of the trial court, in the
,Johnson case are 'veil stated in the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of La". . , aJtd Order, and are as follo,vs ( A.bs.
24-25-26, J ohn.son case):
'' 1. That the said plaintiff and defendant intermarried on the 7th day of June, 1945, and that there
is one child born as the issue of the said marriage,
to-·wit, Denise Johnson, of the age of t"ro years.

"2. That on the 6th day of October, 1947, the
plaintiff commenced an action for divorce in this
court against the said defendant and after due proceedings had the court on the 4th day of December,
1947, made and entered its inter~ocutory decree of
divorce in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, a'varding custody of the minor child to the
plaintiff;
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'' 3. That thereafter. and on the 17th day of December, 1947,. as testified to by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff at the request of the defendant, went to
visit him at ·Milfo':rd, in Beaver County, Utah, where
he was then living, and the parties agreed to become
reconciled and to- resume their relations as husband
and wife, and that thereupon the said parties did
resume their marital relations under an agreement,
mutually entered into and with the mutual understanding they sb.ould remain as husband and wife
and that the divorce decree should be set aside;

"4. That the parties lived together as husband
and wife for a few day and until the defendant
joined the United States Navy;
"5. That upon joining the United States Navy
the defendant arranged for an allotment for . the
plaintiff, as· his wife, declaring her to be his wife,
and that the plaintiff has been rece~ving allotment
checks as the wife of defendan~;
'' 6. That prior to the expiration of six months
from and after the date of entry of the interlocutory
decree the pl~intiff and defendant entered into a
written stipulation providing that the decree should
be set aside, a copy of which stipulation was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff and filed on July
27, 1948, at the time of the hearing of petition to set
aside the interlocutory decree, 'and a copy of which
stipulation is attached hereto and made a part of
these findings a~d marked exhibit 'A';
'' 7. That· the said defendant, after joining the

United States Navy,.has been absent from the United States, and ·has neve.r· had an ·opportunity to return, but that he has frequently corresponded with
the defendant, addressing her as his wife on all
such occasions ;
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'' 8. No motion or application was made to the
court for setting aside the divorce decree, other than
the filing of the petition as aforesaid, until July
27th, 19-!H, \Yhen the hearing on the said petition was
had, nor \Yas the court prior to the filing of said
petition informed or given notice that the parties
had become reconciled or resumed th~ir marital relations;
'• 9. No final decree "ras ever signed or entered.
''10. The November, 1947, term of the District
Court of Iron County, Utah, ended December 31st,
1947; the January, 1948, term ended April lOth,
1948; the April, 1948, term was in progress at the
time the motion was submitted and the said hearing
had, and had not ended at the time this Court determined the matter of said petition and made its
decision denying the same, so that the term of court
during \Vhich the interlocutory decree became final
according to the terms of said decree, by the provisions of the statute had not ended at the time the
court made its decision denying the said petition.

'' 11. That through inadvertence and neglect
the plaintiff failed and neglected to place the_ written
stipulation in the hands of her attorneys, and failed
to instruct them to file a petition on behalf of plaintiff and defendant to dismiss said action and set
aside the interlocutory decree, until the expiration
of more than six months from and after the date of
its entry, and tha~ the parties were not sure that
such action would be necessary in order that such
divorce decree be prevented from becoming final,
since they had previously agreed that they should
remain as husband and wife and had become reconciled and resumed their marital relations as such.''
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And as conclusions of law from the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now finds :
'' 1. That the decree of divorce in this cause has
become final and is not rio\v subject to being set
aside or vacated;
'' 2. · That this court does not have. jurisdiction
to set aside an interlocutory decree of divorce where
application so to do is not made until after it has
become final under the terms of the statute;
'' 3. That the petition of plaintiff to set aside
and vacate the said interlocutory decree and to dismiss the within entitled action should be denied.
"NOW THEREFORE-by reason of the findings of fact and conclusions of law as aforesaid, and
pursuant thereto and in accordance therewith"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and DECREED
that the petition of plaintiff to set aside and vacate
the said interlocutory decree and to dismiss the
within entitled cause be, and the same is hereby
denied.''
The only difference in the facts of the two cases is
this : In the 'Vood case the parties joined in the petition
to set aside the interlocutory decree after the expiration
of the six months' p.eriod, i.e., took no affirmative legal
steps to set the decree aside. In the ,Johnson case, prior
to the expiration of the six months' period, the parties
signed a stipulation that the decree should be set aside
but neglected to file the stipulation or their petition to
set aside and vacate the said decree until the expiration
of the six months' period.
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In each case, by joining in the petition or by stipulation, the husband and ~rife are in accord in desiring- that
the interlocutory decree of divorce be set aside, althoug-h
on the record the parties are designated as appellants
and respondents.

STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED ON
In each case the parties urge that the trial court, contrary to its conclusions and orders,- has jurisdiction to so
set aside and Yacate the interlocutory decree, and in fact~
it is his clear duty so to do, and that the trial court erred
in denying the petitions to set aside and vacate the respective interlocutory decrees of divorce.

ARGUMENT
The questions involved in these cases may be succinctly stated as follows :
The question presented by both cases is, Where parties to a divorce action, after entry of an interlocutory
decree of divorce but before the decree by its terms or
under the language of the statute becomes final, resume
marital relationship and conjugal cohabitation '\\rith the
express intention of being and living together as husband
and 'vife, are they or either of them entitled to have the
interlocutory decree vacated and set aside on proper petition filed after the six months ,-period, And in the Johnson case, is the wife entitled to that relief under those
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similar circumstances where the parties prior to the expiration of the six months' period stipulated in writing
that the decree be set aside and vacated?
That the courts have the inherent power to set aside
djvorce decrees where the parties have resumed the marital relation before the interlocutory decree becomes final
is 'veil settled. This is true regardless of whether, under
the statutes, the court enters what is commonly termed
a final decree or whether the decree by its own terms or
under the language of the statute becomes final on the
expiration of a. prescribed period of time.
See Olson v. Superior Court (Cal), 165 Pacific 706,
wherein the Court so held; and stating it to be one of
the purposes of the la,v, and one of the purposes of the
waiting period before a divorce becomes final, to give the
spouses a chance to effect a reconciliation 'vhich the la'v
al,vays favors. The Court said that from its very nature
the interlocutory decree can only operate upon facts existing do\vn to the time it is given, that ·a decree could not
be forced upon blameless and nonconsenting parties after
such a reconciliation, and that a court of equity has without expres.s authorization the po,ver to recognize condonations and reconciliations and to do justice to litigants as
may be demanded by such events in their lives as has
arisen subsequent to the entry of the interlocutory decree
and before the expiration of the fixed period when the
interlocutory decree would otherwise become final.·
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See also Nelson r. Nelson (Cal), 60 Pacific (2d) 982.
While both of the above cases refer to statutes under
which one of the parties must go before the court and
procure an actual "final decree," "'l'e ·will later cite cases
holding to the same effect under statutes similar or identical to Utah statute.
The policy of the la'v has been determined by this
Honorable Court in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commiss·ion, 82 Utah 179, 22 Pacific (2d) 104 , as follows:
''The reasons given for the liberal use of powers
by courts with respect to setting aside of divorce
decrees is in harmony with enlightened public sentiment and the time-honored policy of the law which
favors a continuance of marriage relations and the
reconciliation of the parties where possible even
after suit brought or decree entered. Githins v.
Githens, supra: Olson v. Superior Ct. of Merced
County, 175 Cal250, 165 P. 706, 1 A. L. R. 1589. Similar reasons support the exercise of liberal powers
by the courts of this state under our statute in suspending or extending the date of finality after an
interlo~utory decree is entered. In Spencer v.
Clark, supra, the court said: 'The purpose of the
statute is to prevent speedy divorces, to give ample
time for reflection and reconciliation, and to prevent imposition upon the court. It therefore provides for a procedure without formalities, and an
application by any party, whether interested or not.'
' ' The law seems to be settled that a court has
no power to set aside or vacate a judgment not void
on its face, unless the motion is made within the
time fixed by Section 6619. Lees v. Freeman, 19
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Utah 481, 57 P.- 411; Dell v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal.
App. 436, 200 P. 85. An exception to this rule is
_made by some courts where the action is for divorce
and the motion is made by both parties, in the ab~
sence of intervening rights by third parties. Githens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 235 P. 1023, 43 A. L. R.
547. We need not go to the extent of holding as did
the court in Githens v. Githens that the court which.
granted the divorce has inherent power at any time
after the decree is rendered to set aside and annul
the decree on application of both parties where the
rights of only the parties themselves are concerned
-or affected thereby, for the reason that here the
application was made and decree set ~side and the
action dismissed within the time provided by Sec~
tion 6619. ''
While in the Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission
case cited, this Court did not go so far as to hold with the
Givens v. Githens case therein cited, it did broadly indicate that such would have been the holding if such ruling
had been necessary to a decision.
That case of Githens v. Githens (Colo), 239 Pacific
1023, is a case widely cited by courts of appellate juris~
diction, and is flatly in point. After the entry of the interlocutory decree of divorce the parties in the Githens case
became reconciled, and fourteen years later both parties
petitioned to have the interlocutory decree annulled, and
this was done. I_jater the husband alone petitioned to
vacate the annulling decree, which the Colorado Supreme
Court refused to do. Because the parties to these appeals
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no'v before this Court believe that the Githens case is decisive, they quote at length therefrom:
''The only objection urged by plaintiff in error
to the judgment under review is that, since the
county court is governed by Section 81 of our Code
of Chril Procedure it had thereunder no jurisdiction
to reopen or vacate this decree unless the application therefor 'vas made 'vithin the period of six
months after the adjournment of the term, this application not having been made within the time. If
the Code provision is applicable to divorce actions,
we think the contention not tenable. At the common la,v, as adopted by us, courts of law and equity
in England did not have jurisdiction in divorce
cases. The ecclesiastical courts alone had such
po,ver. The doctrine there \Vas that after a decree
of divorce was rendered reconciliation and living
together as husband and wife by the parties of itself nullified the divorce decree. -rn Barrere v.
BaT-rere, 4 .Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 187, Chancellor Kent,
in an able opinion, refers to the practice in the ecclesiastical courts in England and other countries.
The Barrere Case _,vas one for separation from bed
and board forever or for a limited time. The learned
chancellor decided that, inasmuch as opportunity
should be left open for reconciliation, the proper
course is to declare the separation perpetual with
the po\ver reserved to the parties to come together
under sanction of the court 'vhenever they should
find it to be their mutual and voluntary disposition.
It appears from the opinion in ,Jones v. Jones (N.J.
Ch.) 29 A.. 502, that this decision of Chancellor Kent
led to the enactment of the New York statute in
keeping with his suggestion, and the decisions of
New York, as of New Jersey, and generally in our
states, now are that mere reconciliation of the parSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ties does not annul the judgment of separation or
divorce, but that a decree annulling the same may
be entered upon the cpnsent of the parties, and when
so rendered the marital rights of the parties are restored.
' 'The state's of the Union generally encourage
the permanency and continuity of the marital relation. They look with disfavor upon divorces. No
decree of divorce is maintainable except upon one
or more of the statutory grounds. In the case before us the parties personally appeared in court and
joined in the application to have the absolute decree
of divorce theretofore entered set aside and held
for naught. It was not against, but in consonance
with, public policy to grant such relief. The parties
in their written application expressly say that they
had never recognized the decree of divorce but had
been and were living together as husband and wife
from the time of its rendition. No rights of third
persons are involved. While vve have no statute
upon the subject-at least our attention is not called
to any-the court had inherent jurisdiction at any
time after the decree was rendered, and where only
the rights of the parties themselves are concerned,
to set aside and annul this decree of divorce, when
the parties, as here, joined in the written request
therefor. Indeed, the acts and conduct of the partie·s, according to their own statement in legal effect,
was a common law marriage entered into after the
decree of divorce was granted.''
Appellants .to this appeal call particular attention
that the Colorado statute (Chapter 56, S.ection 13) provides as follows:
"If, however, a divorce ought to be granted, the
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court shall enter an interlocutory decree, providing
that the parties to such action shall be divorced six
( 6) months after the date of such interlocutory decree. D11ring that six ( 6) months period the parties
shall not be divorced and neither party shall contract another marriage during sueh period. During
such period the court may, upon motion or petition
of either party to the action, or upon its own motion,
for g·ood cause sho'vn _after a hearing·, set aside such
interlocutory decree. Such interlocutory decree
such be a final order as of the date of its entry."

In other words, the Colorado statute is similar in
effect to Sections 40-3-6 and 40-3-7, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, which provides as follows:
'' 40-3-6. Interlocutory Decree.
''If E!fter the hearing of any divorce cause the
court is of the opinion that the divorce ought to be
granted to either person, a decree shall be entered
granting to such person a divorce; but the decree
shall specifically provide that it shall not become
absolute until the expiration of six months from the
date of its entry.
''40-3-7. When Decree Becomes Absolute.
''The decree of divorce shall become absolute
at the expiration of six months from the entry thereof, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review
are pending, or the court before the expiration of
said period for sufficient cause upon its own motion
or upon the application of any person, whether interested or not, other,vise orders.''
A still later Colorado case (and appellants reiterate
that the Colorado statute is similar in effect to our own,
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is that of .Jordan v. Jordon (Colo), 96 Pacific (2d) 13.
Under facts similar to the cases at bar, the Court held:
''The question is, must decrees of the nature
here, wholly disregarded by the parties, remain sacrosant nevertheless 1 The only office of such decree
is to make judicially evident the fact that the marriage relation between the parties, although once
obtaining, no longer exists. 'Vhere the parties, as
here, continue their 1narriage notwithstanding the
divorce, upon what rule or reasonable hypothesis
· shQuld decrees erroneously determining otherwise
remain of record 1 \V e think of none. On the contrary, as 've conceive, public policy demands that
the parties to such a situation be relegated to the
status resulting from their formal ma~riage, and
'vhich, as now appears, their alleged short-comings
did not rupture nor decrees of court interrupt That
"?hich seems desirable procedure is best effectuated
by vacating the decrees, as \Vas done by the trial
eourt. See Githe·ns v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 239 P.
1023, 43 ~J\. L. R. 547.''
\V e are impressed by the statetnent of the Court in

the ,Jordan case to the effect that 'vhere the parties continue their marriage not,vithstauding the interlocutory
decree of divorce, the divorce decree erroneously determining other,vise should not remain of record. Appellants
add that a Court should nevet recognize a decree that not
only erroneously determines a marriage to be nonexistent
'vhich is actually existent, but should never recognize a
decree that the parties themselves neither recognize nor
'vish of record.
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It is noted that the cases at bar are cases wherein all
of the parties seek by petition, or by stipulation, to have
the decree annulled. In most litig·ated_ cases only one of
the parties contends that the decree should be annulled,
and the adverse party contends that the decree should
remain as a finality. It 'vill also be observed that no
rights of third persons intervene in either of the cases at
bar, and no property rights of the parties themselves or
of third persons are involved.
The latest case flatly in point is that of Shinn v.
Shinn, 148 Nebraska 832, decided in 1947. Again the
statute is similar to our O"\\--n, to-wit:

''A decree of divorce shall not become final or
operative until six months after trial and decision,
except for the purpose of review by appeal, and for
such purpo_se only the d~cree shall be treated as a
final order as soon as rendered; Provided, if appeal
shall have been instituted within three months, such
decree shall not become final until sue!\ proceedings
are finally determined. If no such proceedings have
been instituted, the district court may, at any time
within said six months, vacate or modify its decree,
but if such decree shall not have been vacated or
modified;· unless proceedings are then pending with
that end in view, the original decree shall at the
expiration of six months become final without any
further action of the court. Section 42-340, R. S..
1943,. Nebraska.''
In the Shinn case, which was one of the first impression before that Court, after an exhaustive review of the
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authorities, the Court held that even though application
to have the interlocutory decree of divorce annulled was
made and filed after the waiting period, if the parties
had resumed the marital relationship prior thereto, the
Court must annul the decree.
Appellants believe that· the Shinn case is conclusive
o.f the question before this Court and we cite at length:
'' 'The problem is one of whether the parties
have become so reconciled as to have fully resumed
relations as man and wife with- the intention that
they be permanent, obviating the necessity or desire
for termination of the marriage and ma:king its continnance a matter of social propriety and probable
success. The factors involved are less legal than
social, and such few decisions as there are only emphasize the incongruity of seeking to place divorce
suits on the same plane as those to quiet title or
replevin a chattel for unpaid installments of the
purchase price. '
''The record in the instant case sho"\vs a continuous living together in the relationship of husband and wife by the plaintiff and defendant from
September 12, 1941, to May 31, 1945. We are convinced that uncfer the circumstances and the evidence in this case it- "\Vas the plaintiff's duty, when
he condoned the misconduct of his wife upon which
he obtained the decree of divorce and the parties
reconciled their differences, to have informed the
district court accordingly. The reconciliation having occurred prior to the decree of divorce becoming absolute, the plaintiff's failure to so notify the
court constituted a fraud perpetrated by him on the
court. We further believe that had the rourt known
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the full circumstances it would, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, have set aside and vacated the
decree of diYorce obtained on April 14, 1941, by the
plaintiff.
''The cases of Carp~nter v. Carpenter, supra,
and Colick v. Coliek, supra, are cited by the plaintiff
on the theory that since the decree of divorce becomes absolute at the expiration of six months
'vithout further action of the court, the resumption
of marital relations within that period does not prevent the decree from becoming final or operative at
the expiration thereof ; that the proceedings to vacate the decree of divorce within six months period
from the rendition thereof is not ex parte in nature,
and notice must be given to the other party to en,.
able such party to be heard if desired. In the instant case no such notice ~,was given the defendant,
and plaintiff contends that she is bound to know
the law on the subject.
'' W ~ find nothing in the foregoing cases that,
applied to the circumstances and the evidence in the
case at bar, would 11pset the substantive law of this
state and deny the right of a party to resort to a
court of equity to vacate a decree of divorce obtained
against such party by fraud, after. the divorce becomes absolute. Nor do we find anything in the
cited cases that would bar a court of equity from
vacating a decree of divorce when the facts disclose
a fraud was perpetrated on the court. Courts are
protected by law when such instances occur. Reconciliation of the parties 'vas not involved in the t'vo
cited cases.
·''Where parties, ·as here, continue their marriage and start to do so before the decree or' divorce
becomes absolute, or in other words notwithstandSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing the divorce, upon what rule or reasonable
hypothesis should decrees erroneously determining.
otherwise remain of record 1 We think of none. In
_this con:qection, see Jordan v. Jordan, 105 Colo. 171,
96 P. 2d 13; Githens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 239 P.
1023, 43 ·A. I~. R. 547. To so hold would make a
farce of judicial procedure and open the door to unlimited fraud and imposition on innocent an<l trusting persons. The result would be to make the law
an instrument of oppression and a. trap for the un'vary, and often-times would -develop intolerable
situations involving innocent children and creditors
in good faith, to say nothing of the parties them..
selves, in extricable confusion. Nothing but harm
would result for all concerned.

''We conclude, for the reasons given in this
opinion, that the <;leQree of the district court in
finding generally in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant should be, and is hereby, reversed:: that the decree of divorce procured by the
plaintiff, against the defendant on April 14, 1941,
be, and is hereby; set aside and vacated, and the
district court is directed to enter judgment accord. .
ingly.''
In the Johnson case, at bar, the parties, prior to the
expir~tion of the six months' period, stipulated in writing that the interlocutory decree of divorce should be set
aside and the action dismissed, but it was filed after the
expiration of the six months' period. Appellant, Norine
M. Johnson, urges that a court of equity should always
set aside any decree, divorce or otherwise, taken after the
parties agree that a decree should not be entered and the
action should be dismissed. While, from the cases here-
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inbefore cited by appellants, we find that divorce actions

are treated in a different category than actions for money
judgments and decrees and the like, even in an action for
a money judgment, a court of equity in a suitable proceeding would set aside a judgment taken afte1· the parties had stipulated to a dismissal. Not only would such
a judgment be a fra.ud upon the adverse party, but a
fraud on the court..
Appellants, and each of them, respectfully submit
that the orders of the trial court were erroneous and the
decisions of the trial court should be reversed.

Respectf,ztlly

subm~itted,

C;LINE, 'WILSON AND CLINE,

.Attorneys for Appellants.
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